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This paper provides the first quantitative evidence on the restrictiveness of services policies in 2016 for 
a sample of developing countries, based on recently released regulatory data collected by the World 
Bank and WTO. We use machine learning to recreate to a high degree of accuracy the OECD’s Services 
Trade Restrictiveness Index (STRI), which takes account of nonlinearities and dependencies across 
measures. We use the resulting estimates to extend the OECD STRI approach to 23 additional countries, 
producing what we term a Services Policy Index (SPI). Converting the SPI to ad valorem equivalent 
terms shows that services policies are typically much more restrictive than tariffs on imports of goods, 
in particular in professional services and telecommunications. Developing countries tend to have higher 
services trade restrictions, but less so than has been found in research using data for the late 2000s. We 
show that the SPI has strong explanatory power for bilateral trade in services at the sectoral level, as 
well as for aggregate goods and services trade. 
Keywords 
International trade; trade in services; machine learning; services policy; trade restrictiveness indicators. 




Services play an important role in economic development. Because services account for a significant 
share of total output in even very poor countries, the operation of services sectors matters for overall 
economic performance. The importance of services for development is augmented as a result of their 
role as inputs into production for a broad cross-section of industries, including agriculture as well as 
manufacturing. The cost, quality and variety of services available in an economy helps determine the 
productivity of ‘downstream’ sectors. Services also matter for the achievement of the sustainable 
development goals (SDGs): improving access to health, education, and finance or enhancing 
connectivity through investment in information and communications technologies and transport and 
logistics networks all involve services activities.1  
Restrictive trade and investment policies may impact negatively on firms using services as inputs, 
reduce the competitiveness of services exporters and increase prices and/or lower the quality of services 
available to households.2 Trade in services is like trade in goods in allowing specialization according to 
comparative advantage, inducing competitive pressures and knowledge spillovers, but differs in that 
often it requires the cross border movement of providers, whether legal entities (firms) or natural persons 
(services suppliers). A consequence is that trade in services involves a much broader range of policy 
instruments than trade in goods (Francois and Hoekman, 2010). 
Well-known data weaknesses hamper analysis of how policies towards imports and exports of 
services, foreign direct investment and, more generally, regulation affects the operation of services 
sectors. Although data on services activities in developing economies has been improving, in part as the 
result of periodic firm-level surveys that have resulted in large panel datasets (e.g., the World Bank 
enterprise surveys), comparable information on external service-sector policies of developing countries 
is very limited. Information on policies often is patchy at best. Time series data on relevant policy 
variables generally are not available on a cross-country, comparable basis. This situation began to 
change in the late 2000s with a World Bank project to collect information on services trade and 
investment policies and to create services trade restrictiveness indicators (STRIs) that constitute a 
numerical summary of applied services policies believed to affect trade flows (Borchert et al., 2014). 
These STRIs in turn have been used to estimate sectoral ad valorem tariff equivalents for 103 countries 
(Jafari and Tarr, 2017). The OECD has gone further than the World Bank by compiling STRIs for its 
member countries as well as major emerging economies that span a broader range of policies and 
services sectors, including both discriminatory and regulatory measures. The OECD STRI is available 
on an annual basis starting in 2014, and covers 45 countries. 
A problem for applied policy research on developing country services trade policies is that the OECD 
STRI database covers only a small number of emerging countries, while the World Bank STRI data – 
which cover 103 countries – are limited to one year, 2008.3 As a result, extant empirical research on 
developing country services trade policies has been constrained to cross-section analysis, using 
increasingly outdated information. The World Bank has been collaborating with the WTO secretariat to 
update the information on developing countries. A first result of this joint venture was the recent 
publication on the jointly managed Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) website of a database of 
applied services trade policies for the year 2016. These data span many emerging and developing 
economies as well as OECD member countries. To date, the World Bank and WTO have not released 
2016 STRIs calculated using the policy data made available through I-TIP. In this paper, we utilize the 
                                                     
1 See https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/topics/sustainabledevelopmentgoals for more detail on SDG targets. 
2 See, e.g., Borchert et al. (2011; 2016), Balchin et al. (2016), Fiorini and Hoekman (2018), and Helble and Shepherd (2019). 
3 The World Bank data are at https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/dataset/services-trade-restrictions-database but were not 
accessible at the time of writing this paper (last accessed December 8, 2019). 
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World Bank-WTO information on 2016 services policies to generate new indicators of services policy 
restrictiveness in eight services sectors for a 23 countries not included in the OECD STRI.4 The new 
data provide an opportunity to analyze services trade policies using information that post-dates the 2008 
global financial crisis. In addition to describing the pattern of services trade restrictiveness across 
regions and income groups, we use the 2016 indicators to analyze their role as determinants of trade and 
real incomes and the potential effects of several liberalization scenarios, both unilateral (on a 
nondiscriminatory basis) and through preferential trade agreements. 
A challenge in generating indicators of services trade policy from information on applied measures 
is the need to appropriately weigh and aggregate policies on a sector-by-sector basis. A contribution of 
this paper is to apply a machine-learning algorithm to the policy data to construct indicators that are 
broadly consistent with the STRI methodology used by the OECD in that they correlate well with the 
OECD STRIs. Because the full detail of the methodology used to produce the OECD indices is 
proprietary and not published, it is not possible to simply apply the OECD methodology to generate 
STRIs that are strictly comparable to those reported in the OECD database. 
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 1, we discuss briefly the new data on 2016 services 
policies published by the WTO. Sections 2 and 3 describe the methodology used to generate services 
policy indicators (SPIs) from this information and present the resulting policy indicators and associated 
ad valorem equivalents. Section 4 validates the SPIs by assessing their ability to act as statistically 
significant predictors of trade flows using a standard structural gravity model of total trade and specific 
services sectors. Section 5 conducts counterfactual services policy reform experiments using the gravity 
model. Section 6 concludes. 
1. New Data on Services Policies 
In November 2019, the World Bank and WTO released an update to their jointly managed I-TIP 
platform containing extensive data on services policies in a large number of countries. In its raw state, 
the dataset includes 121 countries, 25 sectors and three modes of supply: cross-border trade in services 
(Mode 1 in WTO speak), Mode 3 (establishment of a commercial presence in a foreign country – 
essentially foreign direct investment in a services sector), and Mode 4 (temporary cross-border 
movement of services suppliers). The data exclude Mode 2, where trade occurs through movement of 
consumers to a foreign country (e.g., tourism) as this is generally unrestricted.  
The dataset pertains to policies observed in 2016 that potentially affect services trade. It has nearly 
a quarter of a million observations (244,949), distinguishing up to 445 different measures, both sector 
specific and horizontal. If attention is restricted to countries and sectors for which information is reported 
fully at the level of these individual measures, the country coverage of the falls to 68 countries and 24 
sectors.5 I-TIP data are freely downloadable from the WTO website. Although the WTO provides no 
comprehensive guide to data collection or treatment methodology, Borchert et al. (2018) discuss the 
measures captured by the coding exercise. The source for 45 of the 68 countries is the OECD STRI 
database, so that I-TIP adds information on 23 countries not covered by the OECD (Appendix Table 1 
lists the countries). As with the 2008 iteration of the World Bank STRI, questionnaires administered to 
law firms in the countries of interest generated the raw data, treated by the World Bank and WTO team 
                                                     
4 The OECD produces STRIs for OECD member countries and nine (mostly large) emerging economies: Brazil, China, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Russian Federation, and South Africa. See 
https://qdd.oecd.org/subject.aspx?Subject=063bee63-475f-427c-8b50-c19bffa7392d. The additional countries that are the 
focus of this paper include one (Rwanda) for which data were produced by Shepherd et al. (2019b) with assistance from 
the OECD Secretariat. This brings the total to 24. See Appendix 1.  
5 Many of the measures are coded for only a handful of countries, precluding use in empirical analysis in a cross-country 
setting. As it is important for empirical analysis to have data availability across all relevant data points, we limit 
consideration to the countries and sectors we have identified as satisfying that criterion. 
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to ensure consistency and correctness. Table 1, taken directly from Borchert et al. (2018), lists the 
general categories of measures included in the database. 
Table 1: Classification of World Bank/WTO services policy data 
A Conditions on market entry 
1 Forms of entry (including foreign equity limits) 
2 Quantitative and administrative conditions 
3 Conditions on licensing/qualifications relating to market entry 
4 Other conditions on market entry 
B Conditions on operations 
1 Conditions on supply of services 
2 Conditions on service supplier  
3 Conditions on government procurement 
4 Other conditions on operations 
C Measures affecting competition  
1 Conditions on conduct by firms  
2 Governmental rights/prerogatives (including public ownership) 
3 Other measures affecting competition 
D Regulatory environment and administrative procedures 
1 Regulatory transparency (including licensing) 
2 Nature of regulatory authority (measures related to nature of regulator) 
3 International standards  
4 Conditions related to administrative procedures 
5 Other regulatory environment and administrative procedures 
E Miscellaneous measures 
Source: Borchert et al. (2018). 
2. Constructing an Index of Services Policies from I-TIP Data 
There are two key analytical decisions in designing an STRI given the choice to collect data on particular 
measures: weighting those measures, and aggregating them into an index. The first problem can be 
solved in different ways, such as application of purely statistical methods (e.g., factor analysis – see 
Dihel and Shepherd, 2007) or by using external expert judgment, as in the OECD STRI, which is based 
on a weighting and aggregation system driven by expert input (Grosso et al. 2015). Once weights have 
been assigned, the aggregation problem can be likened to a dimension reduction problem in the applied 
mathematics literature, in the sense that the objective is to produce a single index from a potentially 
large number of individual measures and a set of weights.  
As noted above, the selection of I-TIP data we use span 455 individual policy measures in 68 
countries and 24 sectors. The challenge is to produce an overall index of services policy by sector, and 
then in the aggregate, using those data. Our starting point is an analytical choice to favor economic 
impact: the resulting index must be strongly correlated with trade in services in the context of a standard 
model (Van der Marel and Shepherd, 2013). Another basic premise that guides our approach is that there 
is no such thing as a “perfect” STRI. Small changes to introduce nuances in weighting and aggregation 
are unlikely to lead to major differences in analytical findings. As long as an indicator sits well with the 
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analytical and qualitative literature on services policies in particular countries, has explanatory power 
for trade flows and is robust, we consider it satisfies the general criteria of a “good” index in this context.  
The OECD has published the STRI annually since 2014. There is an active research program based 
on it, showing the index is robustly linked with trade in services (e.g., Nordås and Rouzet, 2017) and 
investigating questions such as the extent and effects of regulatory heterogeneity (Nordås, 2018) and the 
services content of regional integration in the EU (Benz and Gonzalez, 2019).6 The OECD policy 
databases are freely available online, along with a simulation tool that allows users to obtain 
counterfactual STRIs based on discrete policy changes.7 Rather than reinvent the wheel and develop our 
own version of an STRI, we take the OECD STRI as a good benchmark for analysis. Aside from the 
substantive arguments, doing so is appropriate for the simple reason is that over 60% of the I-TIP data 
come from the OECD database. 
The problem then is to reproduce the OECD STRI for the 25 countries included in I-TIP but not in 
the OECD database, in circumstances where the weighting and aggregation codes have not been 
published. A particular issue is that services policies can sometimes be interdependent: for instance, if 
foreign providers are completely locked out of a market, it is irrelevant to policy restrictiveness that the 
business environment for firms in the market is very liberal. It is therefore crucial to take account of 
interaction effects as well as the raw weights attached to particular provisions. A further challenge we 
face is that if attention is restricted to cases where data are fully available, the I-TIP source sometimes 
only contains a subset of the full range of measures used by OECD to construct its STRI. Our aim is to 
reduce the dimensionality of our dataset, from 445 measures to one single index, while retaining as 
much of the complexity of the OECD approach as possible in circumstances where we do not directly 
observe the weights and aggregation procedure.  
This problem is well suited to a basic machine learning application. We construct a dataset containing 
OECD STRIs by sector, then all horizontal and sector specific measures from I-TIP for all 68 countries 
for which full data are available. For the analysis to be feasible, we limit consideration to those sectors 
that correspond well between the two databases, taking simple averages of measures where necessary. 
This reduces the number of sectors we can work with to eight: accounting, legal, commercial banking, 
insurance, air transport, road freight transport, distribution, and telecom. We believe these sectors 
represent a large share of services activity in most country. Although we lose some of the nuance in the 
I-TIP data—which distinguishes sectors at a micro level, such as insurance versus reinsurance, or air 
passenger transport versus air cargo transport—we believe this approach is justifiable given our overall 
objectives as set out above. 
We split the sample into three groups. We randomly assign 75% of observations for which there is 
an OECD STRI to a “training” subsample, with the remaining 25% assigned to a “prediction” 
subsample. Finally, those countries and sectors where no OECD STRI is available are assigned to an 
“out of sample prediction” subsample. 
2.1 Developing Services Policy Indices with Simple Machine Learning 
Our general approach is to use an elastic net as a prediction tool, where the objective is to use the data 
available to produce the most accurate prediction possible of the OECD STRI. The elastic net solves the 
following problem, where ?̂? is the vector of parameters of interest: 
                                                     
6 The body of evidence using the World Bank STRI is smaller, likely reflecting the one-time nature of the exercise which 
limits researchers to cross-sectional analysis See e.g., Borchert et al. (2014), Hoekman and Shepherd (2017), Beverelli et 
al. (2017) and Su et al. (2019) for analyses using the World Bank STRI. 
7 The 2008 World Bank regulatory database was also public, although the website is not available as of writing. However, 
producing counterfactuals is much more involved, as there is no equivalent of the OECD online tool.  
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The first term is the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) loss function. 𝜆 is a penalty term that shrinks 
parameter estimates towards zero in two ways, with a higher parameter resulting in greater shrinkage. 
The first term in square brackets penalizes coefficients that are large in absolute value, while the second 
performs shrinkage based on the square of the parameter value. With 𝜆 = 0, the elastic net collapses to 
standard OLS. With nonzero 𝜆 and 𝛼 = 1, it is the least absolute shrinkage and selection operator 
(LASSO), while with 𝛼 = 0, it is ridge regression. The essence of the procedure is that 𝜆 is iterated for 
given values of 𝛼, with zero coefficients dropped from the model progressively due to the shrinkage 
effect. Iteration continues until a model is selected based on its cross-validation performance, i.e. the 
ability of a model estimated on the training subsample only to produce close estimates of the values in 
the prediction subsample. By proceeding in this way, we can identify a subset of variables that have the 
best explanatory power in terms of the observed OECD STRI, and then use the estimated values from 
the elastic net regression to predict values out of sample, where no OECD STRI exists. 
The elastic net is well suited to prediction problems with large numbers of potential predictors, even 
exceeding the number of observations, and deals well with situations where they are closely correlated. 
To power the tool, we construct a set of explanatory variables that is all sectoral responses, all horizontal 
measures, and a set of sector dummies. We then also create interactions to allow for nonlinear effects 
and dependencies. Specifically, we interact all measures with all other measures, and we create a triple 
interaction between all horizontal measures, all sector specific measures, and the sectoral dummies. The 
I-TIP dataset contains missing entries for many response variables, presumably because they are 
believed to only be relevant to certain sectors. To facilitate the empirical analysis, we therefore code 
these missing values as zero, which means that they do not have any restrictive impact on trade in sectors 
where World Bank and WTO analysts have made an a priori determination of no effect. This approach 
is equivalent to interacting those response variables with a set of sectoral dummies. 
Proceeding in this way gives a dataset of 544 observations, which is eight sectors for 68 countries. It 
is only feasible to proceed with this smaller number of sectors as some of the sectors where I-TIP reports 
data do not correspond to any identified sector in the OECD STRI database. By interacting all of the 
potential explanatory variables, we have 16,974 variables. Many of those variables are constant within 
subsamples, often zero, and so are automatically dropped from the model. In practice, the elastic net 
works with a starting set of 1,606 variables. A standard regression technique like OLS cannot handle 
this problem given the number of observations, but the elastic net can, because the optimization problem 
has kinks due to the absolute value and square terms. Since OLS is unavailable, we therefore use two 
other dimension reduction techniques on the sectoral and horizontal measures to give a point of 
comparison, but ignoring interaction terms: principal factor analysis, and a simple mean. As a robustness 
check, we also set 𝛼 = 1, which yields LASSO estimates, and 𝛼 = 0, which yields ridge estimates. 
Given that the problem in this case is prediction, not inference, we do not report coefficient estimates. 
For the training sample (272 observations), the elastic net retains 59 variables, a mix of measures in 
levels and interactions, and selects 𝛼 = 0.25. The LASSO retains 55 variables, while the ridge estimator 
retains the full set of informative variables, namely 1,606. Table 2 summarizes the performance of the 
three machine learning methods, looking separately at the training and prediction subsamples. 
The three methods perform quite similarly on the training subsample: model fit is tight considering 
the relatively small amount of information used. The mean value of the OECD STRI is 0.279, so a mean 
squared error of only 0.005 using the elastic net indicates that model fit is good. Comparing the two 
parts of Table 2 shows that of the three machine learning methods, the elastic net has the best 
performance: R2 is highest both on the training and prediction subsamples. We therefore prefer the 
elastic net version of our synthetic STRI, but we note that it is relatively close in performance to the 
other two models. 
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Table 2: Output from Elastic Net, LASSO, and ridge applications to OECD STRIs using I-TIP 
data in levels and interactions 
 Mean Squared Error R-Squared Observations 
Training    
Elastic Net 0.005 0.784 272 
LASSO 0.008 0.683 272 
Ridge 0.009 0.594 272 
Prediction 
   
Elastic Net 0.007 0.739 91 
LASSO 0.009 0.674 91 
Ridge 0.012 0.527 91 
Table 3 reports the correlations at the sectoral level among the various measures computed as described 
above. The elastic net again is the strongest performer on this overall criterion, although the other two 
machine learning methods also perform well. The comparator indices, constructed using principal factor 
analysis and a simple mean, have a negative correlation with the OECD index, and thus represent a 
radically different way of summarizing the data. The evidence in Table 3 suggests that the OECD’s 
approach to weighting and aggregating measures results in an output that is substantially different from 
what can be obtained by naïve methods. But our three simple machine learning applications, using 
limited data, do a remarkable job of reproducing the OECD index. Moreover, our preferred method, the 
elastic net, produces predicted values that lie exclusively between zero and unity, as does the original 
OECD index. The alternative approaches do not have this property, nor would a simple OLS regression 
model.  
Figure 1 shows the correlation between the elastic net index, which we name the Services Policies 
Index (SPI), and the OECD STRI at the sector level. The association is not perfect, as would be expected 
with any statistical approach to reproduction of an existing index, but the figure shows that our SPI fits 
the original data well, which gives us confidence that out of sample estimates for the countries not in 
the OECD database should perform well, in particular given the similarity of the R2 measures for the 
training and prediction sub-samples, as noted above. 






















LASSO SPI 0.851 0.983 1.000  
  
Ridge SPI 0.816 0.909 0.869 1.000   
Principal Factors 
SPI -0.266 -0.327 -0.350 -0.430 1.000 
 
Simple Mean SPI -0.357 -0.415 -0.416 -0.536 0.780 1.000 
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Figure 1: Correlation between the STRI and SPI, sector level 
 
To avoid terminological confusion in the remainder of the paper, we refer consistently to the OECD 
STRI as the STRI. Our constructed indices based on I-TIP data are referred to as Services Policy Indices 
(SPIs). The difference in terminology highlights that we are simply mimicking the OECD’s original 
approach using a broader dataset. Ownership of the full methodology used to produce the OECD’s 
indices lies with that organization, and we use a simple data-driven technique to extend database 
coverage. 
3. Descriptive Evidence on Services Policies in the Developing World 
Having shown that our machine learning approach provides an acceptable approximation to the OECD’s 
STRIs, and having used it to produce an SPI that closely mimics the STRI, we present some descriptive 
evidence on services policies in the developing world. Our approach, based on the I-TIP data, expands 
country coverage by 23 middle-income countries where there is full and complete data availability 
across all measures.8  
Figures 2 and 3 show average values of the elastic net SPI by developing region, with the OECD 
considered separately. Interpretation of these results requires caution, because the I-TIP data only cover 
a small number of countries in each region (see Appendix 1). Nonetheless, some indicative results 
emerge from the data. Figure 2 considers business and financial services in four subsectors. While most 
developing regions are more restrictive than the OECD in these subsectors, the differences are not 
always large in absolute terms, although detailed modeling would be required to establish what these 
differences equate to in terms of economic impacts. South Asia and the Middle East and North Africa 
are typically the most restrictive developing regions, while policies tend to be more liberal in the other 
regions. Sub-Saharan African economies have relatively liberal policies compared with other 
                                                     
8 No low income countries are included in the version of the dataset we use. 
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developing regions, and is typically one of the closest regions to the OECD average in these subsectors. 
Looking across sectors, average restrictiveness is highest in legal services. 
Figure 3 considers the remaining four sectors. The pattern is generally similar, although South Asia 
is relatively more liberal, and East Asia and the Pacific appears more restrictive relative to other 
developing regions. The OECD is again generally more liberal in most sectors, while Sub-Saharan 
African countries perform relatively well compared with other developing regions. 
Figure 2: Average SPIs by developing region and OECD, business and financial services 
 
Figure 3: Average SPIs by developing region and OECD, transport, distribution, and telecom 
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In the absence of time series data for all 68 countries in our sample, it is difficult to draw strong 
conclusions as to the direction of policy change. The fact that average scores follow a relatively narrow 
distribution suggests policy convergence may be taking place with respect to the OECD. The extent of 
convergence obviously differs substantially by sector, and would need to be confirmed by subsequent 
work, but would be indicative of an important shift in applied services policies relative to bound policies 
under the GATS. An important question for future research will be to examine the political economy 
dynamics underlying any observed changes in policies over time. It is to be hoped that the I-TIP database 
will be expanded to include the original World Bank STRI data concorded with the I-TIP horizontal and 
sectoral measures. Once these data become available, our simple machine learning methodology can 
produce close correlates to the OECD STRI for 2008 in addition to 2016. With such a long gap between 
observations, the data should provide clearer evidence of policy change and possible convergence. 
While index scores are of interest in their own right, it is important to have some gauge of the extent 
to which they affect the incentives facing economic operators. A convenient concept is the ad valorem 
equivalent (AVE), namely the rate of ad valorem tariff protection that would, if applied, effect the same 
degree of market insulation as the bundle of regulations summarized by the SPI. The next section 
estimates gravity models of trade at the sectoral and aggregate levels. At the expense of a parameter 
assumption, it is straightforward to derive AVEs from this kind of model, as in Benz (2017) and 
Shepherd et al. (2019a, 2019b). Concretely, we apply the estimates from column 2 of Tables 5-8 to 
convert gravity model estimates of the elasticity of bilateral trade with respect to the SPI based on the 
STRI sectors covered by the available trade data. Using the notation developed in the next section, the 
calculation is straightforward: 
𝐴𝑉𝐸𝑗 ≡ 𝑡𝑖𝑗 − 1 = exp (
−𝛽𝑆𝑃𝐼𝑗
𝜃
) − 1 
As for the counterfactual exercises in section 5, we assume that the trade elasticity is equal to 8.25, 
which is a midpoint of recent estimates. Appendix 2 reports full results. These are summarized in Figures 
3 and 4. Of course, the general pattern within sectors is the same as for the SPI results, as there is a 
simple, though nonlinear, relationship between the two. We therefore focus on the relative distortions 
that are present across sectors. The most restrictive sectors based on our AVEs are telecom, legal, and 
air transport. 
Figure 4: Average AVEs by developing region and OECD, business and financial services 
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Figure 5: Average AVEs by developing region and OECD, transport, distribution, and telecom 
 
In a qualitative sense these findings accord well with previous work based on the 2008 World Bank 
STRI, such as Jafari and Tarr (2017), who also find that professional services and telecom (primarily 
fixed line) are the sectors with the highest AVEs. The main takeaway from this exercise is that AVEs in 
services sectors are high relative to applied rates of tariff protection in goods markets. An AVE of 10%, 
20%, or 30% represents a significant restriction to consumers and firms accessing services from foreign 
suppliers. 
4. Validating the SPI with Trade Data 
We have already shown that our SPI closely mirrors the OECD’s STRI, which helps establish its validity 
as a measure of services policies. An important additional step in validating the SPIs is demonstrating 
their ability to act as statistically significant predictors of trade flows. We therefore estimate a standard 
gravity model of total trade (goods and services combined), as it is established that services policies not 
only affect trade in services, but also trade in other goods that use services as inputs (Hoekman and 
Shepherd, 2017; Shepherd, 2019). We use a structural gravity model in line with current best practice, 
as embodied in Anderson et al. (2018). Estimation is by Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML), 
which means that estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity, take account of zero flows, and produce 
fixed effects (by exporter and by importer) that correspond exactly to the quantities prescribed by theory 
in Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003)-type models (Fally, 2015). 
To formalize the above statements, the standard gravity model takes the following form, considering 
a single year and single sector cross-section only: 
(1) 𝑋𝑖𝑗 = 𝐹𝑖𝐹𝑗𝑡𝑖𝑗
−𝜃𝑒𝑖𝑗 
Where: Xij is exports from country i to country j; the F terms are exporter and importer fixed effects; tij 
is bilateral trade costs; 𝜃 is a parameter capturing the sensitivity of demand to cost; and eij is an error 
term satisfying standard assumptions. Numerous theoretical frameworks are consistent with this model, 
including as the Armington-type model of Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), the Ricardian model of 
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Eaton and Kortum (2002), and the heterogeneous firms model of Chaney (2008). Arkolakis et al. (2012) 
and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) show that a wide class of quantitative trade models, including 
the canonical ones just cited, have the same macro-level implications for the relationship between trade 
flows and trade costs even though their micro-level predictions are quite different.  
Trade costs t are specified in the usual iceberg form. These costs are unobserved, but can be specified 
in terms of observable proxies. For present purposes, we include standard gravity model controls based 
on geography and history, along with tariffs, a preferential trade agreement (PTA) dummy, and an 
indicator of service sector restrictiveness (STRI for presentational purposes), as well as an interaction 
between the STRI and a dummy for countries that are members of an Economic Integration Agreement 
(EIA), the services equivalent of a PTA for goods. Formally: 
(2)  − 𝜃𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑗 = 𝑏1𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏2𝑆𝑇𝑅𝐼𝑗 ∗ 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝐸𝐼𝐴𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏3 log(1 + 𝑡𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏4𝑃𝑇𝐴𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏5 log(𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑗) + 𝑏6𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑢𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏7𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏8𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑙𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝑏9𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑗
+ 𝑏10𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑒 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖𝑗 + 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑗 
Table 4 provides variable definitions and sources, along with those for equation (1). With the exception 
of trade flows, the data sources are largely standard. Equation 1 should in principle cover all directions 
of trade, i.e. including trade from country i to country i, or intra-national trade. Inclusion of intra-national 
trade data is crucial in order for PPML to produce theory-consistent fixed effects estimates (Fally, 2015). 
International trade data do not include this term, so we use the Eora multi-region input-output table to 
do the job.9 Eora covers 183 countries and 26 sectors through a single harmonized input-output table. 
We use data for 2015 only, the latest available year, corresponding most closely to the year of our SPI 
data (2016).  
As noted above, our SPI data start from 24 sectors defined in the World Bank/WTO dataset, which 
we concord to 8 sectors in the OECD STRI classification. We then further concord those data to four 
Eora sectors by taking simple averages of the relevant indices: distribution, finance and business 
services, telecom, and transport. It is not possible to estimate gravity models at a more detailed level as 
the Eora database in harmonized form is necessarily highly aggregated. We note in passing that a 
substantial number of the sectoral categories in the original World Bank/WTO dataset may be 
meaningful to professionals within a given sector or for historical reasons, but they will prove difficult 
to map to economic data in a systematic way. Examples are reinsurance and internet services, which are 
typically not separately captured either by trade or production data, and fixed line telephony, which is 
now superseded by mobile telephony in most countries. 
  
                                                     
9 See https://worldmrio.com/.  
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Table 4: Variables, definitions, and sources 
Variable Definition Source 
Colony Dummy variable equal to one if one country in a pair was in a 




Dummy variable equal to one if the two countries were 




Dummy variable equal to one if both countries in a pair have a 
language in common, spoken by at least 9% of the population. 
CEPII. 
Contiguous Dummy variable equal to one if the two countries share a 
common land border. 
CEPII. 
EIA Dummy variable equal to one of the two countries are 
members of the same Economic Integration Agreement. 
Egger and 
Larch (2008). 
Exports Gross exports from country i to country j in sector s (2015). Eora. 
Intl Dummy variable equal to one if country i and country j are 
different. 
Authors. 
SPI Services Policies Index (Elastic Net, Lasso, Principal Factors, 
and Simple Mean). 
Authors. 
Log(Distance) Logarithm of distance between country i and country j. CEPII. 
Log(Tariff) Logarithm of 1 + applied tariff rate. TRAINS 
PTA Dummy variable equal to one if country i and country j are 
part of the same preferential trade agreement in 2015. 
Egger and 
Larch (2008). 
Same Country Dummy variable equal to one if the two countries were ever 
part of the same country. 
CEPII. 
STRI OECD Services Trade Restrictiveness Index. OECD 
A second point that requires explanation is the interaction term between services policies and EIA 
membership. The services policies in I-TIP apply on a most favored nation (non-preferential) basis, 
which is why we map them to MFN policies from the OECD data. The OECD has collected preferential 
data for services trade within the EU, but there is no systematic dataset covering preferential services 
policies around the world. However, many countries are members of trade agreements that potentially 
provide substantially improved market access conditions for their service providers relative to the MFN 
benchmark. By interacting MFN policies with a dummy for joint EIA membership, we seek to capture 
that effect. Our expectation is that the coefficient on MFN policies will be negative (trade reducing), 
while the coefficient on the interaction term will be positive (showing that trade reduction is attenuated 
by regional integration). Benz et al. (2018) show conclusively in the case of the EU that intra-bloc 
services policies are far more liberal than those pertaining to non-EU countries. 
Table 5 reports gravity model regression results for the distribution sector. Column 1 includes the 
OECD STRI, and as expected, the policy variable has a negative coefficient, while the interaction term 
with EIA membership has a positive one, with both estimates statistically significant at the 10% level. 
The baseline data therefore support the view above that the measures captured by the STRI tend to 
restrict trade, in line with Nordas and Rouzet (2017), with that effect attenuated by joint membership of 
a trade agreement covering services. The same patterns of signs and magnitudes applies for the four 
SPIs, elastic net, LASSO, ridge, and principal factors. The simple mean has no statistically significant 
coefficients. We therefore conclude that the most naïve of our testbed of SPI measures does not have 
significant predictive value for trade, but that other measures that attempt to summarize the available 
data more systematically do have such power.  
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Table 6 repeats the exercise for financial and business services. Results are similar to those for 
distribution. The elastic net, LASSO, and ridge SPIs perform somewhat better than the STRI in that the 
levels term and the interaction term both have coefficients with the expected signs and magnitudes, and 
are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. This is likely due to increased sample size for the 
SPIs. Column 1 contains data on 183 exporters and 45 importers, while the remaining columns all use 
183 exporters and 68 importers. The principal factors SPI does not have any statistically significant 
coefficients, while the simple mean SPI has a negative and 1% statistically significant coefficient in 
levels, but a statistically insignificant coefficient for the interaction term. The most naïve measures of 
services policies again have at best limited explanatory power, in contrast to more sophisticated 
measures like the STRI and the SPIs. 
Table 7 reports results for telecom services. The pattern of findings is again quite similar: the STRI, 
as well as the elastic net, LASSO, and ridge SPIs, all have explanatory power for bilateral trade flows 
in this sector, although none of the interaction terms except for the LASSO model has a statistically 
significant coefficient, which suggests that regional integration may not be a strong force for global 
trade in this sector. By contrast, the principal factors and simple mean SPIs have positive and 1% 
statistically significant coefficients, which is contrary to expectations.  
Finally, Table 8 presents results for the transport sector. The STRI, elastic net SPI, and ridge SPI all 
have 5% statistically significant coefficients or better in levels and on the interaction term. By contrast, 
the principal factors SPI and the simple mean SPI do not have any statistically significant coefficients. 
Results for this sector therefore accord well with those from the other sectors. 
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Table 5: Gravity models for distribution services using different measures of services policies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STRI*Intl -5.617 *            
(3.076)      
STRI*Intl*EIA 3.735 *            
(2.154)      
SPI Elastic Net * Intl   -5.960 ***          
 (2.263)     
SPI Elastic Net * Intl * EIA   5.218 **          
 (2.285)     
SPI LASSO * Intl     -5.694 **        
  (2.388)    
SPI LASSO * Intl * EIA     5.294 **        
  (2.676)    
SPI Ridge * Intl       -7.678 ***     
    (2.393)   
SPI Ridge * Intl * EIA       8.141 ***     
    (2.317)   
SPI PF * Intl         -1.755 **    
    (0.730)  
SPI PF * Intl * EIA         2.633 ***    
    (0.724)  
SPI Mean * Intl            0.532   
     (0.482) 
SPI Mean * Intl * EIA           -0.428   
     (0.408) 
EIA -0.424  -0.607  -0.680  -1.389 *** 0.109  1.469   
(0.389) (0.479) (0.602) (0.530) (0.150) (0.939) 
Log(Distance) -0.328 *** -0.333 *** -0.335 *** -0.320 *** -0.308 *** -0.343 ***  
(0.085) (0.086) (0.085) (0.087) (0.087) (0.084) 
Contiguous 0.675 *** 0.356  0.377  0.369  0.362  0.382   
(0.215) (0.250) (0.252) (0.255) (0.255) (0.255) 
Colony 0.316  0.329  0.370 * 0.299  0.455 ** 0.357 *  
(0.245) (0.207) (0.199) (0.210) (0.192) (0.213) 
Common Language 0.112  0.393 ** 0.388 ** 
 
0.389 ** 0.396 ** 0.386 **  
(0.176) (0.177) (0.179) (0.172) (0.176) (0.186) 
Common Colonizer 0.374  -0.102  -0.209  -0.095  -0.301  -0.235   
(0.610) (0.367) (0.364) (0.379) (0.377) (0.368) 
Same Country 0.388  0.967 *** 1.013 *** 1.120 *** 1.054 *** 0.956 ***  
(0.379) (0.296) (0.290) (0.304) (0.305) (0.294) 
Intl -5.734 *** -5.662 *** -5.664 *** -5.206 *** -6.763 *** -8.164 ***  
(0.688) (0.574) (0.628) (0.612) (0.277) (1.063) 
Constant 8.230 *** 8.074 *** 8.083 *** 7.990 *** 7.923 *** 8.135 ***  
(0.528) (0.523) (0.518) (0.530) (0.529) (0.508) 
Observations 8418 12444 12444 12444 12444 12444 
R2 0.986 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.983 0.982 
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All models are estimated by PPML Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country pair in 
parentheses below parameter estimates. Statistical significance is indicated as follows: * (10%), ** (5%), and 
*** (1%). 
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Table 6: Gravity models for finance and business services, STRI and SPIs 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STRI*Intl -1.620 **            
(0.639)      
STRI*Intl*EIA 1.078             
(0.689)      
SPI Elastic Net * Intl   -3.359 ***          
 (1.002)     
SPI Elastic Net * Intl * EIA   2.776 ***          
 (1.034)     
SPI LASSO * Intl     -3.819 ***        
  (1.174)    
SPI LASSO * Intl * EIA     3.020 **        
  (1.195)    
SPI Ridge * Intl       -5.154 ***     
    (1.630)   
SPI Ridge * Intl * EIA       4.807 **     
    (1.871)   
SPI PF * Intl         0.516     
    (1.058)  
SPI PF * Intl * EIA         1.166     
    (0.984)  
SPI Mean * Intl            -3.459 ***  
     (0.771) 
SPI Mean * Intl * EIA           0.040   
     (0.670) 
EIA 0.095  -0.126  -0.184  -0.726  0.694 *** 0.724   
(0.216) (0.307) (0.354) (0.540) (0.112) (0.565) 
Log(Distance) -0.470 *** -0.365 *** -0.364 *** -0.372 *** -0.357 *** -0.396 ***  
(0.061) (0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.068) (0.066) 
Contiguous 0.421 *** 0.552 *** 0.553 *** 0.553 *** 0.597 *** 0.525 ***  
(0.154) (0.168) (0.168) (0.166) (0.165) (0.171) 
Colony 0.163  0.211  0.220  0.196  0.289 ** 0.350 **  
(0.167) (0.155) (0.154) (0.155) (0.145) (0.146) 
Common Language 0.432 *** 0.527 *** 0.532 *** 0.523 *** 0.526 *** 0.520 ***  
(0.103) (0.106) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107) (0.105) 
Common Colonizer 0.309  0.609  0.596  0.540  0.441  0.062   
(0.345) (0.660) (0.663) (0.654) (0.672) (0.601) 
Same Country 0.248  0.321  0.320  0.357  0.226  0.183   
(0.275) (0.228) (0.231) (0.229) (0.218) (0.215) 
Intl -5.253 *** -5.267 *** -5.155 *** -4.719 *** -6.336 *** -3.493 ***  
(0.260) (0.307) (0.336) (0.483) (0.215) (0.639) 
Constant 10.268 
*** 
9.448 *** 9.442 *** 9.487 *** 9.401 *** 9.641 ***  
(0.379) (0.429) (0.428) (0.419) (0.418) (0.404) 
Observations 8418 12444 12444 12444 12444 12444 
R2 0.991 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 0.989 
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All models are estimated by PPML. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country pair are in 
parentheses below parameter estimates. Statistical significance: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 7: Gravity models for telecom services using different measures of services policies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STRI*Intl -4.389 ***            
(0.709)      
STRI*Intl*EIA -0.307             
(0.738)      
SPI Elastic Net * Intl   -10.117 ***          
 (1.494)     
SPI Elastic Net * Intl * 
EIA 
  2.957           
 (1.969)     
SPI LASSO * Intl     -11.247 ***        
  (1.981)    
SPI LASSO * Intl * EIA     4.577 *        
  (2.703)    
SPI Ridge * Intl       -12.934 ***     
    (2.160)   
SPI Ridge * Intl * EIA       0.647      
    (2.099)   
SPI PF * Intl         4.059 ***    
    (0.645)  
SPI PF * Intl * EIA         -0.030     
    (0.593)  
SPI Mean * Intl            0.817 ***  
     (0.156) 
SPI Mean * Intl * EIA           -0.136   
     (0.171) 
EIA 0.183  -0.357  -0.684  0.095  0.465  0.790 *  
(0.201) (0.463) (0.635) (0.477) (0.582) (0.445) 
Log(Distance) -0.604 *** -0.479 *** -0.495 *** -0.486 *** -0.511 *** -0.514 ***  
(0.058) (0.071) (0.073) (0.067) (0.065) (0.069) 
Contiguous 0.529 *** 0.668 *** 0.668 *** 0.670 *** 0.754 *** 0.734 ***  
(0.151) (0.164) (0.174) (0.153) (0.174) (0.171) 
Colony 0.018  0.071  0.148  -0.038  0.245  0.218   
(0.188) (0.162) (0.171) (0.164) (0.185) (0.151) 
Common Language 0.304 *** 0.447 *** 0.368 *** 0.533 *** 0.335 *** 0.298 ***  
(0.103) (0.107) (0.107) (0.116) (0.114) (0.106) 
Common Colonizer 0.166  0.556  0.442  0.466  0.219  0.294   
(0.234) (0.526) (0.527) (0.500) (0.509) (0.548) 
Same Country 0.226  0.185  0.190  0.125  0.182  0.129   
(0.368) (0.227) (0.239) (0.221) (0.270) (0.270) 
Intl -4.142 *** -3.236 *** -2.955 *** -2.630 *** -9.568 *** -7.530 ***  
(0.259) (0.423) (0.527) (0.473) (0.697) (0.411) 
Constant 9.106 *** 8.113 *** 8.211 *** 8.151 *** 8.309 *** 8.328 ***  
(0.366) (0.438) (0.452) (0.417) (0.404) (0.427) 
Observations 8235 12444 12444 12444 12444 12444 
R2 0.975 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.972 0.971 
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All models are estimated by PPML. Robust standard errors adjusted for clustering by country pair in 
parentheses below parameter estimates. Statistical significance: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Table 8: Gravity models for transport services using different measures of services policies 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STRI*Intl -8.360 ***            
(1.643)      
STRI*Intl*EIA 4.693 ***            
(1.377)      
SPI Elastic Net * Intl   -4.375 *          
 (2.389)     
SPI Elastic Net * Intl * 
EIA 
  4.624 **          
 (2.159)     
SPI LASSO * Intl     -1.168         
  (2.602)    
SPI LASSO * Intl * EIA     4.913 **        
  (2.439)    
SPI Ridge * Intl       -8.532 *     
    (4.968)   
SPI Ridge * Intl * EIA       8.544 **     
    (3.680)   
SPI PF * Intl         -1.581     
    (0.967)  
SPI PF * Intl * EIA         1.229     
    (0.876)  
SPI Mean * Intl            0.217   
     (0.366) 
SPI Mean * Intl * EIA           -0.195   
     (0.292) 
EIA -1.139 ** -0.741  -0.785  -1.951 * 1.439 ** 0.898 ***  
(0.483) (0.692) (0.746) (1.165) (0.594) (0.272) 
Log(Distance) -0.446 *** -0.320 *** -0.328 *** -0.320 *** -0.329 *** -0.323 ***  
(0.066) (0.057) (0.058) (0.058) (0.057) (0.056) 
Contiguous 0.400 *** 0.430 *** 0.420 *** 0.442 *** 0.405 *** 0.415 ***  
(0.143) (0.151) (0.155) (0.152) (0.146) (0.153) 
Colony 0.323 * 0.402 * 0.434 ** 0.395 * 0.397 * 0.428 *  
(0.188) (0.214) (0.214) (0.211) (0.217) (0.219) 
Common Language 0.437 *** 0.546 *** 0.552 *** 0.538 *** 0.572 *** 0.555 ***  
(0.130) (0.112) (0.113) (0.115) (0.119) (0.112) 
Common Colonizer 0.044  0.174  0.115  0.128  0.238  0.179   
(0.191) (0.303) (0.293) (0.311) (0.309) (0.312) 
Same Country 0.206  0.154  0.132  0.170  0.166  0.141   
(0.285) (0.229) (0.233) (0.222) (0.223) (0.235) 
Intl -1.912 *** -3.824 *** -4.833 *** -2.540  -6.136 *** -5.397 ***  
(0.706) (0.789) (0.792) (1.560) (0.701) (0.313) 
Constant 8.256 *** 7.311 *** 7.355 *** 7.308 *** 7.362 *** 7.329 ***  
(0.409) (0.349) (0.353) (0.351) (0.346) (0.343) 
Observations 8418 12444 12444 12444 12444 12444 
R2 0.958 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 0.952 
Importer FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: All models are estimated by PPML with importer and exporter fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
adjusted for clustering by country pair. Statistical significance: * (10%), ** (5%), and *** (1%). 
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Taken together, these results indicate that the OECD STRI has much greater explanatory power for 
bilateral trade flows in services than naïve measures like a principal factor or simple mean. Moreover, 
our three SPIs generally exhibit very similar performance to the OECD STRI, albeit with a substantially 
larger sample due to greater importer coverage. The difference in observations is just over 50%, so there 
are clear advantages to these extended measures based on data collected by the World Bank/WTO but 
aggregated into indices based on our machine learning-based reproduction of the OECD’s approach. 
Given the strong and consistent explanatory power of the STRI and its derivative SPIs, the bar for 
producing a “better” indicator of services trade restrictions is very high. In the absence of substantial 
additional benefits, it is far from obvious that further work in this area—in the sense of changing weights 
or adopting different aggregation schemes—passes a cost benefit test, given the substantial time and 
resources that need to be devoted to dealing with the problems of weighting and aggregation discussed 
above.  
While any indicator of services trade restrictiveness should be a strong predictor of bilateral services 
trade, recent work has shown that because of the input-output relationships that exist between services 
and other sectors, it is also likely that services policies affect total trade (i.e., goods and services).10 We 
test this hypothesis and the predictive power of our SPIs compared with the STRI using aggregate Eora 
data summed across all 26 goods and services sectors in the database. The specification is the same as 
in the preceding tables, except that we use a dummy for PTA rather than EIA membership, to capture 
goods agreements as well as services agreements, and we include the log of the applied tariff rate as an 
additional explanatory variable. We aggregate the STRI and our SPIs by taking simple averages across 
sectors. 
Table 9 reports the results. We again use the full sample, but as tariff data are not available for all 
country pairs, the number of observations is lower than in the previous tables. As in the regressions 
using sectoral services trade, the STRI, elastic net and ridge SPIs have the expected negative 
coefficients, and are statistically significant at the 1% level. In addition, all three variables also have 
positive coefficients on the interaction term with the EIA variable, again statistically significant at the 
1% level. The simple mean SPI also displays this pattern of coefficients, but the principal factor SPI has 
unexpected signs.  
  
                                                     
10 Hoekman and Shepherd (2017) and Shepherd (2019). 
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Table 9: Gravity models for total trade (goods and services), STRI and SPIs 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
STRI*Intl -2.939 ***           
 
(0.649) 
    
 
STRI*Intl*EIA 1.188 ***           
 
(0.347) 
    
 




   
 
SPI Elastic Net * Intl * 




   
 












SPI Ridge * Intl       -4.445 ***     
    (1.535)   
SPI Ridge * Intl * EIA       2.214 ***     
    (0.440)   
SPI PF * Intl         2.385 **   
 
    
(1.155)  
SPI PF * Intl * EIA         -1.085    
 
    
(1.229)  
SPI Mean * Intl            -0.526 * 
 
     
(0.297) 
SPI Mean * Intl * EIA           0.508 *** 
 
     
(0.100) 
Log(Tariff) -0.283  -7.242 *** -7.942 *** -6.170 *** -12.551 *** -8.984 *** 
 (1.519) (1.833) (1.832) (1.870) (2.293) (1.954) 
PTA 0.074  -0.277 ** -0.305 ** -0.272 ** 0.120  -0.320 *** 
 
(0.122) (0.119) (0.122) (0.122) (0.117) (0.124) 
Log(Distance) -0.548 *** -0.443 *** -0.443 *** -0.442 *** -0.450 *** -0.439 *** 
 
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.059) 
Contiguous 0.443 *** 0.502 *** 0.499 *** 0.506 *** 0.473 *** 0.484 *** 
 
(0.126) (0.138) (0.139) (0.135) (0.162) (0.145) 
Colony 0.176  0.191  0.204  0.174  0.212  0.234 * 
 
(0.148) (0.138) (0.137) (0.136) (0.134) (0.137) 
Common Language 0.159  0.322 *** 0.327 *** 0.315 *** 0.316 *** 0.336 *** 
 
(0.105) (0.098) (0.097) (0.098) (0.105) (0.100) 
Common Colonizer 0.172  0.137  0.106  0.121  -0.092  0.050  
 
(0.138) (0.329) (0.332) (0.331) (0.400) (0.342) 
Same Country 0.609 *** 0.744 *** 0.737 *** 0.762 *** 0.783 *** 0.734 *** 
 
(0.234) (0.233) (0.235) (0.234) (0.286) (0.250) 
Intl -3.358 *** -3.565 *** -3.709 *** -3.052 *** -4.079 *** -3.591 *** 
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(0.248) (0.261) (0.312) (0.374) (0.199) (0.366) 
Constant 12.188 *** 11.341 *** 11.344 *** 11.339 *** 11.387 *** 11.320 *** 
 
(0.369) (0.366) (0.364) (0.364) (0.362) (0.366) 
Observations 8366 12392 12392 12392 12392 12392 
R2 0.988 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 0.985 
Importer Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Exporter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Note: Robust s.e. adjusted for clustering by country pair. Statistical significance: * (10%), ** (5%), *** (1%). 
We conclude that in addition to being a strong predictor of sectoral services trade, the OECD STRI is 
also a strong predictor of total trade, which is consistent of the important role services play as inputs 
into the production of exports in other sectors. Moreover, the performance of the elastic net SPI mimics 
that of the OECD STRI closely but with a significantly expanded sample. These results, along with those 
presented above, suggest that our choice to use simple machine learning techniques to produce SPIs that 
mimic the OECD STRI in an efficient way results in measures that are relatively parsimonious in their 
use of data, but have similar explanatory power for the outcomes of interest. 
5. Services Liberalization by Developing Countries: Trade and Income Impacts 
The previous section developed and validated new measures of services policies in 23 countries not 
covered by the OECD STRI, in a way that generates SPIs that are as close as possible to what the STRI 
would be if extended directly to those countries. The resulting measures are strongly predictive of 
bilateral trade in services at the sectoral level, as well as of aggregate trade. Their performance is very 
close to that observed for the OECD STRI, but with significantly expanded country coverage. To 
demonstrate the usefulness of data on services policies, this section conducts a counterfactual 
experiment using the gravity model. Since we have estimated the model in a theory consistent way, 
these experiments are straightforward to implement, albeit at the expense of some changes in data set 
up.  
The gravity models we have estimated fall into the general class described by Arkolakis et al. (2012) 
in that they satisfy the following primitive assumptions: 
1. Dixit-Stiglitz preferences. 
2. A single factor of production. 
3. Linear cost functions. 
4. Perfect or monopolistic competition. 
5. Balanced trade. 
6. Aggregate profits are a constant share of aggregate revenues. 
7. The import demand system is CES. 
As noted above, these assumptions are satisfied by numerous commonly used gravity models, such 
Anderson and Van Wincoop (2003), Eaton and Kortum (2002), and Chaney (2008). A remarkable 
feature of this class of models is that they can all be solved very straightforwardly in terms of relative 
changes. Arkolakis et al. (2012) and Costinot and Rodriguez-Clare (2014) show that all models in this 
class have the same macro-level implications for the relationship between trade flows and trade costs 
even though their micro-level predictions are quite different. Building on these insights, Baier et al. 
(2019) develop a simple algorithm for solving for counterfactual changes in bilateral trade given a 
change in trade costs and an assumption for the trade elasticity. We adopt their model here, using a Stata 
package made publicly available by the authors. Concretely, their approach uses exact hat algebra (Dekle 
et al., 2008) to solve for counterfactual trade (and other endogenous variables, such as wages, prices, 
and expenditure), which gives the following expression for changes in trade: 
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Where: w is the wage rate, P is a CES price aggregate, and E is expenditure. Hat notation means that for 
any variable v, 𝑣 ≡
𝑣′
𝑣
 where a prime indicates variable v’s counterfactual value.  
Arkolakis et al. (2012) show that once counterfactual values of trade have been calculated, it is 
straightforward to calculate the corresponding change in real income (welfare, Y): 






⁄  is the share of domestic expenditure. 
To run counterfactuals in this way requires a square dataset, with the number of importers equal to the 
number of exporters. In additional results available on request, we show that the regressions in Table 9 
perform in a qualitatively and quantitatively similar way with the smaller dataset (4624 observations for 
our SPIs). Using the square dataset, the parameters of interest have coefficients equal to -2.544 (elastic 
net SPI) and 2.233 (elastic net SPI interacted with EIA dummy), both of which are statistically 
significant at the 1% level. As discussed above, our preferred SPI due to its out of sample predictive 
power is the elastic net. 
A key assumption that affects the level but not the pattern of estimated trade and welfare effects is 
the value of the trade elasticity 𝜃. Anderson and Van Wincoop (2004) report gravity-based estimates 
equivalent to a trade elasticity of between 5 and 10. Other work has narrowed that range considerably. 
Eaton and Kortum (2002) find a value of 8.28, while recent work by Caliendo and Parro (2015) reports 
an average value across sectors of 8.22. Given the availability of recent, high quality estimates, we do 
not re-estimate the parameter directly, but instead assume 𝜃=8.25, which is the midpoint of the Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) and Caliendo and Parro (2015) estimates. 
Our chosen counterfactual is a partial liberalization scenario where we look at the trade and welfare 
impacts of reducing tariffs and services restrictiveness separately by similar proportions. We consider 
10% cuts in each. While a 10% cut in applied tariffs has a concrete policy interpretation, a 10% cut in a 
country’s SPI score is harder to interpret, and could take many forms depending on the exact measures 
that are changed. However, as the OECD’s online simulation tool for the STRI shows, it is quite possible 
for analysts and policymakers to translate these kinds of percentage changes into concrete differences 
in regulation, albeit with more latitude as to final form than in the case of tariffs. 
We simulate the model using the approach set out above, based on a gravity model re-estimated using 
a square dataset of 68 exporters and importers (estimation results available on request). Table 10 reports 
results from the counterfactual. It is apparent that the trade and welfare impacts of reducing the 
restrictiveness of services policies by 10% is greater in most cases than a similar proportional reduction 
in applied tariffs. Note these results take full account of preferential trade arrangements through the 
interaction term with the EIA dummy in the case of services, and by data construction in the case of 
tariffs. Taking a simple average across the 27 developing (non high income) countries in the sample, 
reducing the restrictiveness of services policies by 10% would boost real income by 0.5%, compared 
with 0.4% for a 10% cut in applied tariffs. Both figures are modest, but given that the policy changes 
are relatively small, that should not be surprising. They suggest that developing countries stand to benefit 
from reforming services policies. We are agnostic as to what those reforms might comprise, as SPIs can 
be reduced by 10% in many ways.  
Another point that emerges from Table 10 is that in both scenarios, trade changes are typically an 
order of magnitude greater than changes in real GDP. Mathematically, such a result is not surprising 
given the form of the Arkolakis et al. (2012) formula for welfare changes, but it is important to keep in 
mind, as policy debates often privilege large trade effects while downplaying that these changes 
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primarily involve redistribution of economic resources from producers to consumer. Reforms generally 
produce much smaller pure gains through the elimination of deadweight losses. 
Table 10: Simulation results for non-high income countries, 10% reductions in services policy 
restrictiveness and tariffs (separately), percent of baseline 
 Services Tariffs 
Change in: GDP Exports Imports GDP Exports Imports 
Bangladesh 0.684 9.724 5.450 0.625 8.398 4.707 
Brazil 0.669 6.318 5.559 0.676 5.940 5.226 
China 0.680 4.692 5.701 0.599 4.074 4.950 
Colombia 0.182 3.350 1.373 0.194 3.139 1.286 
Costa Rica 0.151 1.494 1.149 0.170 1.676 1.289 
Dominican Republic 0.132 1.723 0.922 0.286 3.765 2.015 
Ecuador 0.703 6.603 5.934 0.487 4.336 3.897 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 0.739 11.346 5.785 0.386 5.611 2.861 
Indonesia 0.483 2.881 3.951 0.356 2.141 2.936 
India 0.841 7.659 6.912 0.664 5.908 5.332 
Kazakhstan 0.492 4.057 4.301 0.468 3.618 3.835 
Kenya 0.446 11.947 3.242 0.370 8.792 2.386 
Sri Lanka 0.868 7.853 7.280 0.580 5.174 4.796 
Mexico 0.171 1.220 1.290 0.337 2.418 2.556 
Myanmar 1.165 0.073 10.193 0.609 0.038 5.302 
Malaysia 0.291 1.964 2.454 0.162 1.128 1.410 
Nigeria 0.714 8.680 5.816 0.603 6.891 4.617 
Pakistan 0.677 4.828 5.779 0.871 5.933 7.102 
Peru 0.194 2.786 1.496 0.175 2.442 1.311 
Philippines 0.500 3.125 4.216 0.203 1.265 1.707 
Russian Federation 0.855 5.327 7.486 0.533 3.264 4.587 
Thailand 0.415 2.967 3.493 0.341 2.387 2.810 
Tunisia 0.665 10.604 5.278 0.146 2.259 1.125 
Turkey 0.582 10.516 4.561 0.119 2.186 0.948 
Ukraine 0.596 7.084 5.140 0.162 1.807 1.311 
Vietnam 0.131 3.496 1.021 0.115 2.849 0.832 
South Africa 0.673 6.857 5.732 0.350 3.398 2.841 
The largest economic gains accrue to the countries that are currently the most restrictive. The case of 
India stands out: it has the second highest aggregate SPI score of any country in our sample, after 
Indonesia, despite the fact that services are a major source of export earnings, and play a more important 
role economically than in most other countries at similar income levels.11 Our results suggest that India’s 
services economy, but also the broader economy, could gain substantially from reform. This point is 
                                                     
11 This finding is consistent with the OECD STRI as well as the 2008 World Bank STRIs, which rank India as among the 
most restrictive countries for services trade. 
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true even when compared with significant tariff reductions, as India is also relatively protective in goods 
markets. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper provides new quantitative evidence on the state of services policies in 23 non-OECD 
countries in 2016, based on regulatory data recently released by the World Bank and WTO. Starting 
from the premise that the OECD STRI represents a proven approach to summarizing the restrictiveness 
of services policies, we use simple machine learning techniques to estimate SPIs for the new data that 
correlate very closely with OECD measures within sample, and therefore essentially constitute an 
extension of the OECD methodology to an additional set of mostly developing countries. Our SPIs have 
significant explanatory power for bilateral trade flows at the sectoral and aggregate levels. In line with 
previous research (see Francois and Hoekman, 2010, for a review), a simple quantification exercise 
shows that the trade and welfare gains from a 10% cut in applied services policies are typically larger 
than those from similar reduction in import tariffs for goods.  
Our SPIs provide the first quantitative snapshot of applied services policies in a significant number 
of developing countries since the World Bank’s STRI in 2008. Averaging by World Bank region shows 
that while there is variation across sectors and OECD member countries are typically more liberal than 
developing economies, the differences are not always large in terms of the index scores and AVEs. This 
finding requires cautious interpretation, as the number of countries is relatively small. The SPIs line up 
well with those of Borchert et al. (2014) using the World Bank STRI for 2008. The relatively small 
differences observed in applied policies across regions could be suggestive of a process of policy 
convergence to more liberal settings, but that can only be determined using data spanning multiple years. 
It is therefore very desirable that the World Bank and WTO make available the original data used to 
generate the World Bank 2008 STRIs in comparable format through the I-TIP platform to facilitate this 
kind of analysis. 
A contribution of this paper to the literature is to provide a “proof of concept” for the use of statistical 
tools, such as machine learning, to capture the complexities, nonlinearities, and dependencies of 
different services policy measures. This is relevant for at least two reasons. One is that the use of such 
techniques allow analysts to extend datasets in instances where a given source of information is limited 
to a subset of countries and the detailed methodology used to calculate published indicators is 
confidential. This is the case for the OECD STRI, arguably the gold standard at the time of writing given 
extensive industry consultation and expert input into the weighting of measures across sectors. Insofar 
as other organizations – in this case the World Bank and WTO – collect similar types of policy data, 
SPIs that correlate well with the OECD STRIs offer a way to extend the country coverage of services 
restrictiveness indicators. Although the focus in this paper is on services trade restrictions, the 
methodology may be useful in other contexts where similar conditions prevail as regards the scope and 
periodicity of efforts to collect information on policies for a given area.  
Another reason the exercise undertaken in this paper is relevant is that the use of statistical tools may 
help to identify potential ways to reduce data collection costs. The OECD STRI involves the collection 
of a large amount of data, entailing significant direct and time costs for agencies involved in this kind 
of work. Further work with machine learning algorithms like those deployed here may identify a subset 
of measures that in fact do most of the explanatory work in terms of bilateral trade flows. In our view, 
this is the primary value of generating these kinds of indices, rather than simply summarizing a vast 
amount of data in a single number. Data collection is distinct from research to fine-tune STRI 
methodologies and improve the associated weighting and aggregation measures. The latter is very 
important but should be independent of the policy collection process. Analysts should have the ability 
to define their own indicators, and it is therefore very welcome that I-TIP has released the 2016 services 
policy information independently of associated STRIs.  
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Although the release of services trade-related policy data in I-TIP is laudatory, as of 2020 the most 
up to date compilation of such measures will be for 2016, and then only for some 30 developing 
countries—without any coverage of most low-income countries. It is unknown whether and when a new 
wave of data will be collected and thus whether over time a panel dataset will emerge. The contrast with 
other initiatives to compile information on development-relevant policies – such as the annual World 
Bank Doing Business report – is striking. A similar effort to generate services policy data on a regular 
basis for a broad range of countries to complement the information reported for its member countries by 
the OECD would allow governments to track their policies, compare them to those of other countries, 
and inform autonomous policy reforms and regional integration processes. We hope this first output of 
services data collection efforts by the World Bank and WTO will be followed with the regular updates 
needed to allow assessments of the effects of policies over time – and that the coverage will be extended 
to more countries. 
The resource costs of a systematic effort to collect services policy data are not large. In our 
experience, assembling the full OECD dataset for one country-sector pair involves one to two weeks of 
time for a junior legal consultant, along with supervision time from a more senior economist. Focusing 
on just five major sectors per country and seeking to cover 50 non-OECD countries would therefore 
involve costs in the range of $400,000 to $750,000, with additional resources required for reporting and 
publishing, though they would be an order of magnitude less than those required for data compilation. 
Doubling coverage to 10 sectors would involve an investment of less than $2 million. Average costs 
could be reduced by making the data collection a bi-annual process. Given how limited services policy 
data are relative to information on merchandise trade policies, allocating this level of resources to filling 
the gap would have a very high benefit-cost ratio, especially if one considers the opportunity costs of 
not having up-to-date information on services policies. These opportunity costs may be high, not least 
because absence of data means policymakers may be less inclined to devote adequate attention to this 
important area of policy.12 If over time application of statistical methods can isolate a smaller number 
of key measures that have most of the explanatory power in terms of bilateral trade, data collection costs 
will fall accordingly – and help target attention on the policies that matter most.  
One priority in this regard is to incorporate the preferential dimension into measures of services 
policy restrictiveness. Another is to expand country coverage. In particular, very few African countries 
are included in I-TIP. Given the salience of regional integration in Africa, it is important to fill in the 
policy blanks to allow assessments of the utility of dealing with services in the context of pursuing 
continental free trade. Benz and Gonzalez (2019) have shown that the EU single market for services is 
much more liberal than any member country’s MFN policies. The extent to which other trade agreements 
effectively liberalize services markets is unclear, but is a vital policy question in an environment where 
bilateral, plurilateral, and mega-regional agreements are becoming more common. On the one hand, 
Shepherd et al. (2019a) find little evidence of substantial liberalization in the Canada-EU Trade 
Agreement (CETA). The same appears to be true for the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific 
Partnership (CPTPP) (Gootiiz and Mattoo, 2017).  
A related important question concerns the value of making binding policy commitments in trade 
agreements, even if these do not entail liberalization. The ‘water’ in the services policy commitments in 
trade agreements often is considerable (see, e.g., Borchert, Gootiiz and Mattoo, 2011; Miroudot and 
Shepherd, 2014; Miroudot and Pertel, 2015; Ciuriak et al. 2017). Research on the value of reducing the 
difference between bound and applied services policies has shown that this may be an important source 
of welfare gain, driven by a reduction in policy uncertainty (Lamprecht and Miroudot, 2018; Ciuriak et 
al. 2019; Egger et al. 2019).  
                                                     
12 Other compilations of policy indicators such as the World Bank Doing Business project attract extensive attention by the 
press and have become focal points for governments because they are undertaken on an annual basis. 
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Again, such analysis requires good quality, comparable information on applied policies collected 
regularly. The OECD does this for its members – and is the source for the majority of the 68 countries 
for which I-TIP reports comprehensive information. Looking forward, we hope the collaboration 
between the World Bank and WTO will do so as well. If not, other development organizations should 
fill the gap. Services policies matter too much to continue to be neglected.  
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Appendix 1: I-TIP Additional Country Coverage  
East Asia & Pacific Europe & 
Central Asia 
Latin America & 
Caribbean 
Middle East & 
North Africa 
South Asia Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Hong Kong SAR, China Kazakhstan Argentina Egypt Bangladesh Kenya* 
Myanmar Ukraine Dominican Republic Oman Pakistan Nigeria 
Philippines 
 




   
Taiwan, China Peru 




   
Vietnam 
     
Note: The table includes only those countries covered by the SPIs that are not included in the OECD STRI.  
* Rwanda is not in I-TIP but comparable policy data for Rwanda were collected by Shepherd et al. (2019b), permitting its inclusion in the analysis. Kenya 
is included in I-TIP but data have been augmented by additional information reported in Shepherd et al. (2019b). 






Distribution Insurance Legal Road Freight 
Transport 
Telecom 
Argentina 14.452 26.403 10.372 16.020 13.513 13.929 11.244 43.400 
Australia 10.371 22.513 7.711 13.660 9.268 10.767 10.468 29.994 
Austria 11.089 21.379 8.367 13.604 9.195 13.495 10.046 26.009 
Bangladesh 17.834 20.786 16.897 19.786 15.036 15.141 14.722 41.368 
Belgium 15.485 21.652 10.268 22.105 10.295 14.270 11.160 32.784 
Brazil 14.045 25.076 18.005 15.826 11.235 14.955 11.597 32.999 
Canada 10.183 23.835 8.197 14.918 9.771 12.307 10.624 34.359 
Chile 10.936 20.540 14.334 15.085 10.565 10.936 11.685 31.559 
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Distribution Insurance Legal Road Freight 
Transport 
Telecom 
China 16.986 25.490 16.250 33.389 17.952 22.523 18.013 55.044 
Colombia 11.223 21.287 10.063 16.149 15.106 15.354 12.474 30.597 
Costa Rica 14.390 19.212 9.068 13.776 10.136 10.569 12.724 42.087 
Czech Republic 10.497 24.294 7.748 13.327 9.052 10.934 10.632 30.106 
Denmark 12.038 23.712 7.893 12.516 9.402 13.053 10.366 26.859 
Dominican Republic 12.508 20.550 15.607 18.119 5.602 10.823 11.506 34.812 
Ecuador 11.303 20.583 10.917 15.260 10.708 10.841 11.831 33.103 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 14.113 20.004 17.960 28.010 11.219 40.246 18.668 90.224 
Estonia 16.403 23.298 8.942 14.322 9.496 18.558 11.254 30.390 
Finland 10.121 26.475 7.866 14.521 8.769 10.162 13.920 27.681 
France 9.654 21.478 8.320 12.867 9.270 15.991 10.047 26.835 
Germany 11.356 23.197 9.506 12.241 8.399 15.923 12.871 24.979 
Greece 15.712 23.729 11.257 14.217 11.029 16.013 10.662 29.033 
Hong Kong SAR, 
China 
15.088 22.366 11.883 20.450 4.052 13.463 12.092 34.369 
Hungary 10.309 22.800 9.112 14.735 8.867 19.056 11.054 28.696 
Iceland 16.668 29.221 15.279 27.112 11.014 15.359 19.299 53.235 
India 35.443 25.431 17.610 32.280 14.726 41.035 14.239 66.708 
Indonesia 21.220 27.172 20.603 48.242 18.152 44.365 25.278 69.117 
Ireland 10.028 22.927 8.501 13.689 8.503 15.394 10.286 26.647 
Israel 14.090 22.695 9.890 14.821 10.265 14.673 11.406 43.457 
Italy 10.403 24.495 9.269 13.927 10.034 12.688 12.354 29.196 
Japan 12.069 22.587 8.839 13.504 11.141 12.964 10.670 33.399 
Kazakhstan 18.685 26.855 20.565 37.949 12.069 13.641 15.888 51.148 
Kenya 13.890 21.216 13.894 19.291 11.468 37.262 13.877 37.351 
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Distribution Insurance Legal Road Freight 
Transport 
Telecom 
Korea, Rep. 42.876 23.641 8.821 17.124 10.935 11.523 12.723 37.525 
Latvia 10.559 23.508 7.410 11.979 9.114 15.321 10.181 26.744 
Lithuania 10.215 22.288 7.473 13.693 8.774 10.519 10.265 26.590 
Luxembourg 11.468 22.420 8.736 20.758 10.137 45.801 10.535 27.307 
Malaysia 11.030 27.317 12.379 26.712 11.388 20.673 15.379 31.208 
Mexico 10.841 23.194 12.956 26.284 11.098 15.451 18.468 40.622 
Myanmar 23.174 51.581 9.914 24.786 41.212 17.768 16.253 51.552 
Netherlands 10.028 23.607 7.204 13.351 8.503 10.331 10.021 27.071 
New Zealand 12.212 28.835 10.347 13.657 9.232 10.923 10.755 36.735 
Nigeria 15.103 27.487 10.585 27.064 11.014 15.440 23.528 56.719 
Norway 10.028 25.775 10.180 17.172 12.696 13.080 13.999 34.785 
Oman 13.151 47.463 13.271 23.857 11.491 11.286 16.840 44.241 
Pakistan 11.223 19.261 13.368 17.598 16.337 11.615 13.284 36.956 
Panama 38.944 21.253 8.280 33.345 11.018 25.231 11.480 32.739 
Peru 12.044 21.783 9.961 19.292 10.757 12.144 16.502 43.907 
Philippines 31.797 19.481 15.854 18.664 11.519 37.353 17.239 71.176 
Poland 9.934 24.197 7.285 12.148 8.584 47.816 9.899 28.121 
Portugal 15.060 23.144 9.288 14.945 8.867 15.714 11.099 30.212 
Russian Federation 11.760 21.979 12.205 17.229 13.194 12.029 13.299 40.239 
Singapore 12.871 26.877 8.947 25.426 11.625 16.909 18.474 52.280 
Slovak Republic 10.121 23.745 7.382 12.645 8.682 17.440 10.143 27.397 
Slovenia 10.497 24.294 8.147 14.604 9.052 21.170 11.166 30.151 
South Africa 11.570 24.056 9.446 14.029 10.828 11.201 11.475 38.702 
Spain 10.309 24.019 8.911 14.269 9.593 15.714 10.788 29.373 
Sri Lanka 12.347 21.139 9.510 20.400 10.557 36.503 14.398 41.045 
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Distribution Insurance Legal Road Freight 
Transport 
Telecom 
Sweden 13.869 22.464 7.306 12.628 8.405 9.881 10.042 25.999 
Switzerland 10.309 22.800 9.286 14.327 9.041 12.861 11.054 35.130 
Taiwan, China 13.691 26.033 9.934 15.592 10.415 12.600 13.511 48.767 
Thailand 17.974 25.725 17.123 20.552 14.559 19.147 18.071 45.608 
Tunisia 26.717 22.569 16.804 26.431 12.633 42.597 12.744 42.886 
Turkey 46.103 25.303 10.644 15.168 10.361 25.405 11.654 35.353 
Ukraine 11.848 21.948 7.877 14.502 10.727 10.449 10.920 28.976 
United Kingdom 10.968 23.461 10.740 12.661 9.605 13.398 10.690 27.721 
United States 11.219 24.472 9.354 15.916 11.616 11.618 11.981 34.351 
Uruguay 12.775 28.434 9.668 15.690 12.510 11.714 11.502 46.933 
Vietnam 12.045 22.905 16.220 21.096 12.652 14.096 23.933 58.563 
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